[MLB-WIRELESS] Fwd: private vs. government control of spectrum

Clae clae at tpg.com.au
Sun Feb 29 03:18:12 EST 2004


Summary:  Private good, public bad, m'kay.

>Delivered-To: politech at politechbot.com
>Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 00:50:26 -0500
>To: politech at politechbot.com
>From: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
>Subject: [Politech] Stuart Benjamin on private vs. government control of
>	spectrum
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>Sender: politech-bounces at politechbot.com
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>---
>
>Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2004 09:32:37 -0500
>From: "Stuart Benjamin" <benjamin at law.duke.edu>
>To: <declan.mccullagh at cnet.com>
>Subject: Law Review Article on Private vs Government Control of the
>	Spectrum
>
>I have followed your work, and your debates with 
>Larry Lessig (among others), over the years.
>
>In any event, I have written a law review 
>article that might interest you.  It's called 
>"Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between 
>Private and Public Control" and it came out in 
>the latest New York University Law Review.
>
>Here is the abstract:
>
>Prominent commentators recently have proposed 
>that the government allocate significant 
>portions of the radio spectrum for use as a 
>wireless commons.  The problem for commons 
>proposals is that truly open access leads to 
>interference, which renders a commons 
>unattractive.  Those advocating a commons 
>assert, however, that a network comprising 
>devices that operate at low power and repeat 
>each other’s messages can eliminate the 
>interference problem.  They contend that this 
>possibility renders a spectrum commons more 
>efficient than privately owned spectrum, and in 
>fact that private owners would not create these 
>“abundant networks” in the first place.  In this 
>Article, Professor Benjamin argues that these 
>assertions are not well founded, and that 
>efficiency considerations favor private 
>ownership of spectrum.
>
>Those advocating a commons do not propose a 
>network in which anyone can transmit as she 
>pleases.  The abundant networks they envision 
>involve significant control over the devices 
>that will be allowed to transmit.  On the 
>question whether private entities will create 
>these abundant networks, commons advocates 
>emphasize the transaction costs of aggregating 
>spectrum, but those costs can be avoided via 
>allotment of spectrum in large swaths.  The 
>comparative question of the efficiency of 
>private versus public control, meanwhile, 
>entails an evaluation of the implications of the 
>profit motive (enhanced ability and desire to 
>devise the best networks, but also the desire to 
>attain monopoly power) versus properties of 
>government action (the avoidance of private 
>monopoly, but also a cumbersome process that can 
>be subject to rent-seeking).  Professor Benjamin 
>contends that, on balance, these considerations 
>favor private control.  An additional factor 
>makes the decision clearer:  Abundant networks 
>might not develop as planned, and so the 
>flexibility entailed by private ownership—as 
>well as the shifting of the risk of failure from 
>taxpayers to shareholders—makes private 
>ownership the better option.
>
>The unattractiveness of a commons for abundant 
>networks casts serious doubt on the desirability 
>of spectrum commons more generally.  If private 
>ownership is a more efficient means of creating 
>abundant networks, then the same is almost 
>certainly true for networks that run the risk of 
>interference.  Most uses of spectrum are subject 
>to interference, so the failure of the commons 
>advocates’ arguments undermines the appeal of a 
>commons for most potential uses of spectrum.
>
>The URL for the article is 
>http://www.nyu.edu/pages/lawreview/78/6/benjamin..html.
>
>I would be happy to send you a hard copy, as well.
>
>Anyway, I hope you find it interesting.  Please 
>feel free to post it to politechbot, or 
>otherwise circulate it, if you think that's 
>appropriate.
>
>
>Stuart M. Benjamin
>Professor of Law
>Duke Law School
>Box 90360
>Science Drive and Towerview Road
>Durham, NC 27708-0360
>
>benjamin at law.duke.edu
>
>(919) 613-7275 (phone)
>(919) 613-7231 (fax)
>_______________________________________________
>Politech mailing list
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>Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)


-- 
_____________________
"When in doubt, make a fool of yourself. There is 
a microscopically thin line between being 
brilliantly creative and acting like the most 
gigantic idiot on Earth. So what the hell, leap! 
" - Peter McWilliams


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