[MLB-WIRELESS] [Fwd: (AUSCERT AA-2004.02) AUSCERT Advisory - Denial of Service Vulnerability in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Devices]
Steven Haigh
netwiz at crc.id.au
Thu May 13 11:19:33 EST 2004
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: (AUSCERT AA-2004.02) AUSCERT Advisory - Denial of Service
Vulnerability in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Devices From:
auscert at auscert.org.au
Date: Thu, May 13, 2004 11:02 am
To: auscert-subscriber at auscert.org.au
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AA-2004.02 AUSCERT Advisory
Denial of Service Vulnerability in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Devices
13 May 2004
Last Revised: --
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1. Description
A vulnerability exists in hardware implementations of the IEEE
802.11 wireless protocol[1] that allows for a trivial but effective
attack against the availability of wireless local area network
(WLAN) devices.
An attacker using a low-powered, portable device such as an
electronic PDA and a commonly available wireless networking card
may cause significant disruption to all WLAN traffic within range, in a
manner that makes identification and localisation of the
attacker difficult.
The vulnerability is related to the medium access control (MAC)
function of the IEEE 802.11 protocol. WLAN devices perform Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), which
minimises the likelihood of two devices transmitting
simultaneously. Fundamental to the functioning of CSMA/CA is the Clear
Channel Assessment (CCA) procedure, used in all
standards-compliant hardware and performed by a Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) physical (PHY) layer.
An attack against this vulnerability exploits the CCA function at the
physical layer and causes all WLAN nodes within range, both
clients and access points (AP), to defer transmission of data for the
duration of the attack. When under attack, the device behaves as if the
channel is always busy, preventing the transmission of
any data over the wireless network.
Previously, attacks against the availability of IEEE 802.11
networks have required specialised hardware and relied on the
ability to saturate the wireless frequency with high-power
radiation, an avenue not open to discreet attack. This
vulnerability makes a successful, low cost attack against a
wireless network feasible for a semi-skilled attacker.
Although the use of WLAN technology in the areas of critical
infrastructure and systems is still relatively nascent, uptake of
wireless applications is demonstrating exponential growth. The
potential impact of any effective attack, therefore, can only
increase over time.
2. Platform
Wireless hardware devices that implement IEEE 802.11 using a DSSS
physical layer. Includes IEEE 802.11, 802.11b and low-speed (below
20Mbps) 802.11g wireless devices. Excludes IEEE 802.11a and
high-speed (above 20Mbps) 802.11g wireless devices.
3. Impact
Devices within range of the attacking device will be affected. If an AP
is within range, all devices associated with that AP are
denied service; if an AP is not within range, only those devices
within range of the attacking device are denied service.
Minimum threat characteristics:
o An attack can be mounted using commodity hardware and
drivers - no dedicated or high-power wireless hardware is
required
o An attack consumes limited resources on attacking device,
so is inexpensive to mount
o Vulnerability will not be mitigated by emerging MAC layer
security enhancements ie IEEE 802.11 TGi
o Independent vendors have confirmed that there is
currently no defence against this type of attack for DSSS
based WLANs
The range of a successful attack can be greatly improved by an
increase in the transmission power of the attacking device, and
the use of high-gain antennae.
3. Workarounds/Mitigation
At this time a comprehensive solution, in the form of software or
firmware upgrade, is not available for retrofit to existing
devices. Fundamentally, the issue is inherent in the protocol
implementation of IEEE 802.11 DSSS.
IEEE 802.11 device transmissions are of low energy and short range, so
the range of this attack is limited by the signal strength of
the attacking device, which is typically low. Well shielded WLANs such as
those for internal infrastructures should be relatively
immune, however individual devices within range of the attacker
may still be affected. Public access points will remain
particularly vulnerable.
The model of a shared communications channel is a fundamental
factor in the effectiveness of an attack on this vulnerability.
For this reason, it is likely that devices based on the newer IEEE
802.11a standard will not be affected by this attack where the
physical layer uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
(OFDM).
It is recognised that the 2.4G Hz band suffers from radio
interference problems, and it is expected that operators of the
technology will already have in place measures to shield their
networks as well as a reduced reliance on this technology for
critical applications.
The effect of the DoS on WLANs is not persistent - once the jamming
transmission terminates, network recovery is essentially immediate.
The results of a successful DoS attack will not be directly
discernable to an attacker, so an attack of this type may be
generally less attractive to mount.
At this time, AusCERT continues to recommend that the application of
wireless technology should be precluded from use in safety,
critical infrastructure and/or other environments where
availability is a primary requirement. Operators of wireless LANs should
be aware of the increased potential for undesirable activity directed at
their networks.
REFERENCES:
[1] IEEE-SA Standards Board, "IEEE Std IEEE 802.11-1999 Information
Technology - Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between
Systems-Local and Metropolitan Area Networks - Specific Requirements -
Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) And Physical Layer
(PHY) Specifications," IEEE 1999.
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf
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AusCERT would like to thank the Queensland University of Technology (QUT)
Information Security Research Centre (ISRC) for the information contained
in this advisory. AusCERT would like to thank all vendors that
participated in this process and provided recommendations for mitigation
and/or confirmed details of the vulnerability.
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AusCERT has made every effort to ensure that the information contained in
this document is accurate. However, the decision to use the information
described is the responsibility of each user or organisation. The decision
to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security
bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be
considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and
procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may
arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this
security bulletin.
If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked
in any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure
National IT Incident Reporting Form at:
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192
AusCERT also maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on:
http://www.auscert.org.au.
Internet Email: auscert at auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for
member emergencies only.
Postal:
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
AUSTRALIA
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Revision History
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Signed,
Steven Haigh
I am root. If you see me laughing, you'd better have a backup.
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